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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Harris v. Quinn, a divided U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
First Amendment’s free speech and free association clauses1 
prohibited an Illinois labor union from collecting agency fees from 
non-unionized in-home personal care assistants.2 To reach this 
holding, the Court concluded that its landmark case Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education was not applicable to Harris and applied only to 
cases that involved employees employed solely by the state.3 
This Note begins with a brief history of the constitutionality of 
collective bargaining agency fees in the United States.4 It then 
addresses the key facts of Harris and outlines the arguments made 
in the majority and dissenting opinions.5 In analyzing the Court’s 
holdings in Harris,6 this Note deduces that: (1) Abood should have 
been controlling, and that the Harris Court improperly 
distinguished Abood;7 (2) the majority’s conclusion would have 
been appropriate in the absence of Abood;8 (3) instead of 
distinguishing Abood, the Court should have overturned it as 
unconstitutional and relied instead on Pickering v. Board of 
Education;9 and (4) overturning Abood would not unduly or 
unjustifiably aggravate existing agency shop case law.10 Finally, this 
Note concludes that the Court’s decision in Harris was a product of 
a result-oriented, policy-driven judiciary, and that the decision not 
to overturn Abood serves to further crystalize Abood’s 
unconstitutional holding in common law.11 
 
 1.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2.  Harris v. Quinn (Harris III), 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014). 
 3.  Id. (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 211 (1977)). 
 4.  See infra Part II. For a more detailed look at the history of agency shop 
provisions in the United States, see Norman L. Cantor, Uses and Abuses of the Agency 
Shop, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61 (1983) (illustrating the expansion of agency shop 
legislation). 
 5.  See infra Part III. 
 6.  See infra Part IV. 
 7.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 8.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 9.  391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), abrogated in part by Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 
410 (2006); see infra Section IV.C. 
 10.  See infra Section IV.D. 
 11.  See infra Part V. 
2
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II. HISTORY 
American jurisprudence has had a long and turgid history 
when it comes to agency shop provisions.12 The Court’s decision in 
Abood, the landmark case upon which the Harris Court relied, stems 
from precedent set predominantly by two earlier U.S. Supreme 
Court cases: Railway Employees’ Department v. Hanson13 and 
International Ass’n of Machinists v. Street.14 Because Hanson and Street 
provide the precedential background for Abood, “[a]nalysis of the 
contemporary boundaries of private sector agency shop provisions 
must start with those two cases.”15 
A. Railway Labor Act Cases 
The Railway Labor Act, passed in 1926, was one of the United 
States’ first labor laws.16 Unions and railways alike had grown tired 
 
 12.  For the purposes of this Note, agency shop provisions are clauses in 
collective bargaining agreements assessing fees to non-union members. See Rob 
McKenna & Geoffrey William Hymans, Other People’s Money, 9 J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y 
PRAC. GROUPS 111, 111 (2008) (“In an ‘agency shop’ state, public employees do 
not have to belong to a union but they must still pay a fee, known as an ‘agency 
shop fee,’ to the union to support its collective bargaining activities. In a ‘right to 
work’ state, public employees typically are not required to belong to a union or to 
pay agency shop fees.”). 
 13.  Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956). 
 14.  Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 742 (1961). 
 15.  Cantor, supra note 4, at 66. The history of pre-Abood agency shop 
jurisprudence presented here is necessarily brief. The Court’s 1977 ruling in Abood 
was its first foray into the uncharted territory of agency shop law; prior to Abood, its 
only related rulings were on union shop clauses. See Milton L. Chappell, From 
Abood to Tierney: The Protection of Nonunion Employees in an Agency Shop; You’ve 
Come a Long Way, 15 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1988) (“In 1977, the Supreme Court 
ruled for the first time on the constitutionality of agency shop requirements in the 
public sector.”). 
 16.  It is not quite accurate to say that the Act was “[o]ur first national labor 
law.” William E. Thoms, Collective Bargaining Under the Railway Labor Act, 20 TRANSP. 
L.J. 275, 275 (1992). The Act had several unsuccessful predecessors in the 
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, the Arbitration Act of 1888, and the Erdman 
Act of 1898. See Fernando A. Ruiz, Labor Law—The Railway Labor Act: The Employee’s 
Right to Minority Union Representation at Company-Level Grievance Hearings, 11 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 27, 31–33 (1989). It may be more accurate to say that the Railway 
Labor Act was the first successful labor law, satisfactory both to laborers and to 
railways. See Herbert R. Northrup, The Railway Labor Act—Time For Repeal?, 13 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 442 (1990) (“Following a series of laws dating back to 
the 1880s that neither unions nor carriers found satisfactory, railway management 
3
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of the arbitration requirements associated with early federal labor 
laws, and the nation turned instead to the collective bargaining 
approach to conflict resolution promulgated by the Railway Labor 
Act.17 To facilitate collective bargaining, the Act was amended in 
1951 to include a union shop provision,18 permitting collective 
bargaining agreements between railway carriers and unions to 
mandate employee unionization for all area railway employees.19 
Hanson and Street arose from disputes over this legislation. 
In Hanson, employees of the Union Pacific Railroad Company 
brought a suit against a Nebraska labor union, seeking enjoinder of 
the union’s application of a union shop agreement20 enforced via 
the Railway Labor Act.21 The employees claimed that the union 
shop agreement came into conflict with a provision of the Nebraska 
Constitution.22 At the time of Hanson, the Nebraska Constitution 
 
and unions agreed upon a bill that embodied the collective bargaining system 
developed prior to World War I. This was . . . the Railway Labor Act of 1926.”). 
 17.  Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1926); Ruiz, supra note 16, at 35 
(“The Railway Labor Act primarily emphasized collective bargaining for the 
settlement of labor-management disputes and provided for mandatory mediation 
only if bargaining failed. The Act invoked arbitration only when both parties 
agreed.”). 
 18.  Union shop provisions facilitate collective bargaining by eliminating the 
problem of individuals benefiting from the bargaining process without paying 
union fees, known as “free ridership.” See W.W.A., Annotation, Deduction or 
Collection of Labor Union Dues from Wages of Employees, 135 A.L.R. 507 (1941) (stating 
that union shop laws “serve[ the] substantial public interest of preventing 
union[s] . . . from being undermined by tolerating free riders, i.e., those who 
would enjoy benefits of union negotiating efforts without assuming a 
corresponding portion of union financial burden”). 
 19.  The 1951 amendment created a schism in the Act’s formerly unified 
devotees. The union shop provision was not popular among smaller unions as it 
allowed railway workers who move to a new location to maintain their membership 
of their old union as long as it was “national in scope.” Northrup, supra note 16, at 
447. 
 20.  The term “union shop agreement” in this Note is used to describe an 
agreement where “employees of [a] company would be required to become 
members of the successful union as a condition of retaining their         
employment . . . .” E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Closed Shops and Closed Unions, 160 
A.L.R. 918 (1946). Union shop agreements differ from agreements with agency 
shop provisions in that agency fees do not require employees to join a union, but 
merely require the employee to pay certain union fees. See supra note 12 and 
accompanying text. 
 21.  Ry. Emps. Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 227–28 (1956). 
 22.  Id. at 228. At first blush, there is an apparent supremacy problem: the 
Railway Labor Act is a federal act, and should supersede Nebraska Law. U.S. 
4
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had banned union shop agreements.23 But the Railway Labor Act, 
as amended in 1951, contained a union shop clause stating that, 
notwithstanding any state or federal law to the contrary, “[a]ny 
[railroad carrier] and a labor organization . . . shall be permitted    
. . . to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued 
employment, that . . . all employees shall become members of the 
labor organization representing their craft or class.”24 In response 
to First Amendment arguments raised by the plaintiff railroad 
employees,25 the Court held that the Railway Labor Act presented 
“no more an infringement or impairment of First Amendment 
rights than there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is 
required to be a member of an integrated bar.”26 However, the 
 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the Constitution is “the supreme law of the 
land”). Employee-plaintiffs circumvented this issue, inter alia, by condemning the 
Railway Labor Act as unconstitutional of the First Amendment. Brief for Robert L. 
Hanson, et al., Individual Appellees at 22, Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (No. 451), 1956 
WL 88889, at *22–24. 
 23.  Hanson, 351 U.S. at 228. Nebraska was a “right-to-work” state at the time 
of Hanson, making union shop agreements inherently violative of Nebraska law. See 
McKenna & Hymans, supra note 12, at 111. 
 24.  45 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). 
 25.  The majority opinion in Harris dismissed Hanson’s relevance, claiming 
that Hanson “barely mentioned” the First Amendment. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 
2627 (2014). However, it seems that Court’s decision in Hanson revolved primarily 
around the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim, as the First Amendment was the 
topic of the bulk of the opinion. See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 236–38. 
 26.  Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238. In doing so, the Court overturned the Nebraska 
Supreme Court, which stated that federal enforcement of union shop agreements 
violated private individuals’ right to work and freedom to contract under the Fifth 
Amendment due process clause. Hanson v. Union P.R. Co., 71 N.W.2d 526,     
541–42 (Neb. 1955). This seemingly Lochnerian opinion is somewhat 
anachronistic—while the Nebraska Supreme Court gives a nod to West Coast Hotel 
v. Parrish, one of several cases that heralded the end of laissez-faire Lochner 
jurisprudence, the Court still relied on freedom of contract and right-to-work, 
mainstays of the Lochner Era courts. See id. at 690 (citing W. Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)). For background on Lochner Era jurisprudence, see 
Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional 
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (“[I]n the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, judges concerned about protecting big business from the nascent 
regulatory state departed from the norm of restraint and substituted their values 
for the principles that the Constitution’s framers enshrined and John Marshall 
enforced. In this deviant period, known as the Lochner era, the Court 
underconstrued the scope of congressional power and overprotected private 
property.”). 
For background on how Parrish heralded an end to the Lochner Era, see 
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Court noted the narrowness of the holding, explaining that Hanson 
does not apply where “fee[] . . . assessments [are] used as a cover 
for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention 
of the First Amendment.”27 
International Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, like Hanson, involved 
the application of a union shop clause under authority of the 
Railway Labor Act.28 The plaintiff-employees in Street also filed suit 
based on First Amendment freedom of speech and free association 
claims, seeking enjoinder of the enforcement of the union shop 
agreement.29 Unlike Hanson, however, the plaintiff railway 
employees in Street claimed that their union dues were being “used 
to finance the campaigns of candidates for federal and state offices 
whom [they] opposed, and to promote the propagation of political 
and economic doctrines, concepts and ideologies with which [they] 
disagreed.”30 The Court opted out of answering the constitutional 
 
Ronald A. Parsons & Sheila S. Woodward, The Heart of the Matter: Substantive Due 
Process in the South Dakota Courts, 47 S.D. L. REV. 185, 190 (2002) (“The deciding 
turn from heightened scrutiny may well have occurred with the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, in which the Court 
rediscovered its deferential roots in order to uphold a minimum wage law . . . .”); 
Id. at 211 (“The United States Supreme Court’s decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish is largely credited with tossing some of the final shovels of earth down upon 
the Lochner era of heightened scrutiny in federal substantive due process 
jurisprudence.”). 
 27.  Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238. While the Court echoed Hanson’s distinction 
between ideological and non-ideological union spending in Abood, the Court in 
Harris posited that it is better to distinguish instead between private and public 
sector union spending (disallowing agency shop fees in the latter). Compare Abood 
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) (“[A] union cannot 
constitutionally spend funds for the expression of political views, on behalf of 
political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not 
germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative.”), with Harris III, 134 
S. Ct. at 2633 (“Abood does not seem to have anticipated the magnitude of the 
practical administrative problems that would result in attempting to classify public-
sector union expenditures as either ‘chargeable’ . . . expenditures for ‘collective-
bargaining’ . . . or nonchargeable . . . expenditures for political or ideological 
purposes.” (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 232)). 
 28.  Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 742 (1961). 
 29.  See id. at 742–45; Brief for Appellees, S.B. Street, Nancy M. Looper, Hazel 
E. Cobb, J.H. Davis, Mrs. Edna Fritschel, Mrs. Elizabeth Ferguson, and Others 
Similarly Situated at 63, Street, 367 U.S. 740 (No. 4), 1960 WL 98527, at *63. 
 30.  Street, 367 U.S. at 744. Plaintiffs claimed that the fees were used “for 
purposes other than the negotiation, maintenance, and administration of 
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules and . . . other conditions of employment 
[such as] . . . to support ideological and political doctrines and candidates which 
6
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question posed, positing that “[w]hen the validity of an act of the 
Congress is drawn in question . . . it is a cardinal principle that this 
Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is 
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”31 Instead, the 
Court ruled that the Railway Labor Act did not allow unions to 
spend dues collected through the union shop clause on political 
activities, and thus avoided answering the constitutional question of 
whether the Act was in violation of the First Amendment.32 
B. Abood v. Board of Education 
Street and Hanson provided the precedential backdrop that led 
to the Court’s landmark decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education. Abood, the central authority referenced in Harris, involves 
a Michigan statute that allows a union to enter into an agency shop 
agreement with the state.33 Unlike in Street and Hanson, the union 
in question in Abood represented a group of public employees—
school teachers—as opposed to private railway workers.34 However, 
 
plaintiffs . . . are . . . not willing to support voluntarily.” Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. 
Street, 108 S.E.2d 796, 800 (Ga. 1959). 
 31.  Street, 367 U.S. at 749 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 
(1932)). 
 32.  Id. at 770. While the Court in Abood maintained the doctrine that unions 
are precluded from spending agency shop and union shop fees on political 
activities, some scholars dispute the distinction between political and non-political 
spending. See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 4, at 70–71 (“Forced payments to a service 
organization by all who benefit from the service do not significantly impinge on 
associational or speech interests, even if the beneficiary organization uses a 
portion of the extracted fees to support political or ideological causes opposed by 
some payors. . . . [S]o long as the organization is legally bound to use the funds to 
promote the related functions and goals of the organization, then the disgruntled 
fees payor cannot complain any more than the taxpayer whose funds are used by 
the government for programs ideologically offensive to the taxpayer.”). 
 33.  Abood, 431 U.S. at 211. For the purposes of this Note, “agency fees” and 
“fair share fees” are used interchangeably. There is in reality a minor difference: 
while the cost of agency fees is generally calculated as a percentage of the cost of 
union dues paid by members, “[a] fair share provision defines the pro rata costs of 
the union’s services rather than union dues. This fee can be more or less than 
dues.” Elizabeth M. Bosek, Annotation, Agency Shop; Payment of “Fair-Share” by Non-
Members, 18 IND. L. ENCYC. LAB. REL. § 22 (2015). This difference is insignificant 
enough that the Harris court also uses the terms interchangeably. See Harris III, 134 
S. Ct. 2618, 2633 (2014) (“The PLRA contains an agency-fee provision , . . . 
[l]abeled a “fair share” provision . . . .”). 
 34.  Abood, 431 U.S. at 211–12.  
7
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unlike the union shop clause in the Railway Labor Act, the agency 
shop clause in Abood does not actually require employees to join 
the union—it merely requires employees to contribute to the 
collective bargaining process through the payment of fair share 
fees.35 
Abood arose when Michigan public school teachers filed a class 
action suit against the union assigned to represent them in 
collective bargaining.36 The plaintiffs claimed that the union 
impermissibly infringed upon their First Amendment right to 
freedom of association37 when it included an agency shop clause in 
its collective bargaining agreement.38 This agency shop clause 
required even non-union members to pay collective bargaining fees 
to the union.39 The Abood Court held that the reasoning applied in 
Hanson and Street also applied in the case of public employees, 
stating that “[t]he desirability of labor peace is no less important in 
the public sector [than in the private sector], nor is the risk of ‘free 
riders’ any smaller.”40 Parroting the reasoning in Street, the Court 
held that union expenditures “on behalf of political candidates, or 
toward the advancement of other ideological causes not germane 
to its duties as collective-bargaining representative” must be 
“financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees 
who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not 
coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of 
 
 35.  Id. at 211. The Court did not actually use the term “fair share fees” in the 
decision, but noted that non-union members “must pay to the union, as a 
condition of employment, a service fee equal in amount to union dues.” Id.  
 36.  Id. at 212. In its examination of collective bargaining rights, this Note 
relies on Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of collective bargaining: “Negotiations 
between an employer and the representatives of organized employees to 
determine the conditions of employment, such as wages, hours, discipline, and 
fringe benefits.” Collective Bargaining, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 37.  Plaintiffs’ complaint also charged the union with violating state law 
prohibiting public-sector agency fees and violating plaintiffs’ state free association 
rights as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Abood, 431 U.S. at 213. The 
Court’s discussion of the First Amendment claim subsumes its discussion of the 
other claims, and thus they are not addressed here in detail. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 211. The plaintiffs argued that the union participated “in a number 
and variety of activities and programs which are economic, political, professional, 
scientific and religious in nature of which Plaintiffs do not approve” and that 
“sums required to be paid under [the] Agency Shop Clause are used and will 
continue to be used for the support of such activities and programs.” Id. at 213. 
 40.  Id. at 224.  
8
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governmental employment.”41 Nevertheless, the Court determined 
that agency shop fees are allowable for “collective bargaining 
activities.”42 
C. The Aftermath of Abood 
While many cases after Abood have considered agency shop law, 
these subsequent cases focus on determining on what unions are 
allowed to spend agency shop fees, not on determining the legality 
of the fees overall. But while the law concerning the legality of 
agency shop provisions did not change significantly between Abood 
and Harris,43 it is worth addressing significant agency shop cases 
following Abood to illustrate the complex legal dilemmas 
precipitated by its holding. Thus, the following is a summary of the 
case law engendered by Abood. 
In Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, the 
Court attempted to delineate some rules regarding allowable and 
non-allowable expenditures of agency shop fees.44 The Court ruled 
that the test to determine whether an expenditure is allowable is 
“whether the challenged expenditure[] [is] necessarily or 
reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an 
 
 41.  Id. at 235–36.  
 42.  Id. at 236.  
 43.  See Martin H. Malin, The Evolving Law of Agency Shop in the Public Sector, 50 
OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 861 (1989) (“Because of the procedural posture of the appeal in 
Abood, Justice Stewart declined to define precisely the dividing line between 
permissible and unconstitutional charges.”); Gerald D. Wixted, Agency Shops and 
the First Amendment: A Balancing Test in Need of Unweighted Scales, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 
833, 838 (1987) (“Abood thus removed any constitutional barriers to the existence 
of an agency shop in the public sector . . . . Since Abood, legislatures and courts 
have tried several methods in an effort to strike the proper balance between the 
union and the individual.”). 
 44.  Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447 (1984) 
(noting that the Abood Court did not “define the line between union expenditures 
that all employees must help defray and those that are not sufficiently related to 
collective bargaining to justify their being imposed on dissenters”). Note that Ellis 
was a Railway Labor Act case, and thus did not directly concern agency shop fees. 
See id. at 435. But because Ellis relied so heavily on justification from Abood and 
because the agency shop and union shop agreements are so similar in concept, 
Ellis is often seen as agency shop law. See, e.g., Malin, supra note 43, at 868 (“The 
treatment of litigation expenses in Ellis illustrates how the agency shop’s role in 
reconciling the conflicting first amendment interests of union members and 
objecting fee payers can justify forcing objectors to subsidize some ideological 
activities.”). 
9
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exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the 
employer on labor-management issues.”45 
But even this seemingly straightforward standard produced 
disparate, arbitrary results. In Ellis for instance, the Court applied 
the above standard to social activities at union events and ruled that 
such activities qualified as allowable expenditures, reading the 
standard of “necessarily or reasonably incurred” expenses broadly.46 
But just seven years later, the Court ruled in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty 
Ass’n that union expenditures on public relations were not 
allowable under the Ellis standard, reading the standard far more 
narrowly.47 
Problems also arose in determining how unions should 
consider and resolve claims of non-union members objecting to 
union spending of agency shop fees. The Court first addressed this 
issue in Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson.48 Hudson arose 
from several non-unionized teachers’ claims against their exclusive 
bargaining representative, the Chicago Teachers Union.49 The 
teachers claimed that the union had adopted an unconstitutional 
method of responding to non-member objections to union 
spending of agency fees.50 The Court held that “the constitutional 
requirements for the Union’s collection of agency fees include an 
adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt 
opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial 
decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in 
dispute while such challenges are pending.”51 This standard seems 
to comport with Abood’s requirement that agency fees must prevent 
“compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by employees who 
object thereto.”52 
 
 45.  Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448.  
 46.  Id. at 449 (“While [social activities] are not central to collective 
bargaining, they are sufficiently related to it to be charged to all employees.”).  
 47.  Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 528 (1991). Note that 
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, disagreed with the majority on this 
point, stating that public relations expenditures should be allowable, providing 
further evidence that Ellis’ standard produced varying interpretations. Id. at 534 
(Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 48.  475 U.S. 292 (1986). 
 49.  Id. at 297. 
 50.  Id. at 295. 
 51.  Id. at 310. 
 52.  Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 237 (1977). 
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The twenty-first century, however, heralded the end of the 
Hudson standard. In Davenport v. Washington Education Ass’n, the 
Court reconsidered the standard.53 While the Court did not 
explicitly reverse Hudson, it indicated that union spending of 
agency fees is more constitutionally acceptable when non-members 
are given the opportunity to positively ratify the union’s spending 
choices prior to the spending taking place.54 Several years later, in 
Knox v. Service Employees International Union, the Court further called 
the Hudson standard into doubt, ruling that when agency fee dues 
increase, “the union must provide a fresh Hudson notice and may 
not exact any funds from nonmembers without their affirmative 
consent.”55 Knox is significant in that it was the first case to require a 
union to ask non-members to affirmatively “opt-in” to agency fee 
expenditures instead of merely allowing non-members to “opt-
out.”56 
In sum, post-Abood agency shop cases have been litigated 
primarily on two subjects: (1) the constitutionality of particular 
union expenditures of agency shop fees; and (2) the 
constitutionality of systems put in place by unions through which 
dissenting non-members can object to union spending of agency 
fees. A clear, universally acceptable standard has yet to be found for 
the adjudication of these issues.57 
 
 53.  551 U.S. 177 (2007). 
 54.  See id. at 184 (“The notion that this modest limitation upon an 
extraordinary benefit violates the First Amendment is, to say the least, 
counterintuitive.”). The Court also expressed doubts about Abood and agency fees 
in general, stating that it is “undeniably unusual for a government agency to give a 
[union] the power, in essence, to tax government employees.” Id. 
 55.  132 S. Ct. 2277, 2296 (2012). The Court also pointedly expressed its 
doubts about opt-out spending in general: “Although the difference between opt-
out and opt-in schemes is important, our prior cases have given surprisingly little 
attention to this distinction. Indeed, acceptance of the opt-out approach appears 
to have come about more as a historical accident than through the careful 
application of First Amendment principles.” Id. at 2290. 
 56.  This ruling was controversial. See, e.g., Deborah Prokopf, Public Employees 
at the School of Hard Knox: How the Supreme Court Is Turning Public-Sector Unions into a 
History Lesson, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1363, 1395 (2013) (“The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Knox is a breathtaking display of judicial activism by the far-right wing 
of the Court, which calls into question the future of public-sector unionism in the 
United States.”) (footnote omitted). 
 57.  Though no universal standard has been set, there is a significant trend 
toward anti-unionization, demonstrable through the cases discussed in this Part. 
Abood, a 9-0 opinion in favor of public-sector agency shop agreements, seems to 
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III. THE HARRIS V. QUINN DECISION 
A. Factual Background 
Medicaid, a federal health care program,58 provides funding to 
several states for state-run, in-home care programs for the elderly 
and the ill.59 States use part of the federal funding to compensate 
the personal assistants (PAs) who provide care to the customers.60 
Illinois, one such state funded by Medicaid, operates an in-home 
care program called the Illinois Department of Human Services 
Home Services Program (home care program).61 
In 2003, by executive order, Illinois made Service Employees 
International Union Healthcare Illinois and Indiana (SEIU) the 
exclusive union representative62 for the home care program’s 
employees.63 The SEIU’s collective bargaining agreement with the 
state included an agency shop provision that required non-member 
 
have been the pinnacle of union support in the U.S. Supreme Court. Since Abood, 
rightward movement in the Court and resulting case law have catalyzed a shift 
away from the public-sector agency shop, toward right-to-work rulings. See id. at 
1372 (“While Abood is representative of the ‘new’ model of public-sector labor 
relations prevalent at its time, Knox plainly reflects the anti-union backlash of 
recent years. An examination of the key public-sector union dues cases leading up 
to Knox shows this disturbing evolution in the Court’s jurisprudence.”). 
 58.  See About Us, MEDICAID, http://www.medicaid.gov/about-us/about            
-us.html (last visited May 25, 2016). 
 59.  Harris III, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2623 (2014); Home & Community Based Services, 
MEDICAID, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By      
-Topics/Long-Term-Services-and-Supports/Home-and-Community-Based-Services 
/Home-and-Community-Based-Services.html (last visited May 25, 2016). 
 60.  See Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2624. 
 61.  See id. at 2623; Home Services Program, ILL. DEP’T HUM. SERVS., http:// 
www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=29738 (last visited May 25, 2016). 
 62.  The Governor of Illinois at the time was Rod Blagojevich, who notably 
had several dealings with the SEIU. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Union Is Caught 
Up in Illinois Bribe Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008 
/12/12/us/politics/12union.html; Kris Maher & David Kesmodel, Illinois Scandal 
Spotlights SEIU’s Use of Political Tactics, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2008), http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/SB122973200003022963. For some, this connection 
between Blagojevich and the SEIU called into question the propriety of the 
appointment of the SEIU as the exclusive union representative. See Sean Higgins, 
New Questions Raised About Decision to Let SEIU Represent Illinois Home Health Care 
Workers, ILL. POL’Y (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/news           
/new-questions-raised-about-decision-to-let-seiu-represent-illinois-home-health-care 
-workers. 
 63.  Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2626. 
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PAs to pay a fair share fee to contribute to collective bargaining 
costs.64 
The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (PLRA), which 
authorizes collective bargaining and the collection of fair share 
fees, applies only to state employees.65 Thus, to cover the PAs, the 
PLRA was amended to specify that the PAs are employees of the 
state “[s]olely for the purposes of coverage under the Illinois 
[PLRA].”66 Accordingly, under Illinois law, PAs who care for 
customers through the home care program are employees both of 
the state and of the customer.67 The state compensates the PAs, but 
the customers are responsible for most other employment-related 
duties, including the hiring, firing, training, and discipline of the 
PAs.68 
In 2010, three home care program PAs, Theresa Riffey, Susan 
Watts, and Stephanie Yencer-Price (Petitioners), filed a class action 
on behalf of home care program PAs of the Northern District of 
Illinois against the Governor of Illinois and the SEIU.69 Petitioners 
contended that the fair share provision unconstitutionally abridged 
their First Amendment rights70 to freedom of association and 
freedom of speech71 and sought an injunction against the 
 
 64.  5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/6 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.) 
(“When a collective bargaining agreement is entered into with an exclusive 
representative, it may include in the agreement a provision requiring employees 
covered by the agreement who are not members of the organization to pay their 
proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process.”); Harris, 134 
S. Ct. at 2625. Note that, in accordance with Abood, the provision does not require 
non-unionized employees to contribute financially to all union activities. See supra 
note 27 and accompanying text. 
 65.  Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2625. 
 66.  Id. at 2649 (citation omitted). 
 67.  Id. at 2646. 
 68.  Id. at 2624. But see infra Section IV.A (discussing evidence of some state 
control of employment-related duties). 
 69.  Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2626. 
 70.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 71.  Harris v. Quinn (Harris I), No. 10-cv-02477, 2010 WL 4736500, at *8 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2010). The First Amendment claims in Hanson, Street, Abood, and 
Harris are similar. Concerning free association, the plaintiffs in these cases 
contended that forced unionization or forced support of a union “deprives . . . 
employees of their freedom of association.” Ry. Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 
225, 230 (1956). In Abood and prior agency shop cases, the validity of free speech 
claims was a more contentious issue. In his concurrence in Abood, Justice Powell 
departed from the majority in his comment that prior cases did not support the 
conclusion that “withholding of financial support from a union’s political activities 
13
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enforcement of the agency shop provision.72 The District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division dismissed all 
counts of the complaint with prejudice,73 and the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part.74 The Seventh Circuit 
held that precedent set by Abood and similar cases allowed state 
employees to be compelled to financially support collective 
bargaining representation without running afoul of the First 
Amendment.75 The court further noted that the State of Illinois was 
properly designated as the PAs’ employer, as it holds “extensive 
control over the terms and conditions of employment.”76 The U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.77 
B. Majority Opinion 
The Court reversed the Seventh Circuit,78 addressing several 
issues brought by Respondents SEIU and Illinois Governor Pat 
Quinn on appeal. Primarily, the Court stated: (1) Abood should not 
be extended to the instant case; and (2) the employment question 
in the instant case does not pass the balancing test set out in 
Pickering v. Board of Education. 
 
is a type of ‘speech’ protected against governmental abridgment by the First 
Amendment.” Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 238 (1977) (Powell, J., 
concurring). However, in Harris and later cases, it is uncontested that withholding 
financial support from a union is speech, and the issue is not discussed in the 
holding. Accord Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2288 (2012) 
(“Closely related to compelled speech and compelled association is compelled 
funding of the speech of other private speakers or groups.”). 
 72.  Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2626. 
 73.  Harris I, 2010 WL 4736500, at *32. 
 74.  Harris v. Quinn (Harris II), 656 F.3d 692, 701 (7th Cir. 2011). The district 
and intermediate courts also ruled on a ripeness issue. When the case arose, in 
addition to the plaintiffs in the instant case, a second group of plaintiffs, also PAs, 
but from a different division of the home services program (the Division of 
Developmental Disabilities), were a party to the suit. Harris I, 2010 WL 4736500, at 
*1. The district court dismissed their claim with prejudice as unripe, and the court 
of appeals reversed in part, ruling that the dismissal should have been without 
prejudice because it did not appear “beyond a doubt that there is no way the 
plaintiffs’ grievance could ever mature into justiciable claims.” Harris II, 656 F.3d 
at 701. However, because the disability program PAs are not a party to the instant 
case, this detail is of little significance. 
 75.  Harris II, 656 F.3d at 697. 
 76.  Id. at 699. 
 77.  Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2627. 
 78.  Id. at 2644. 
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1. Distinguishing Abood 
First, the Court distinguished Abood from the instant case, 
observing that the employees in Abood were “full-fledged public 
employees,”79 while employees in the instant case were state 
employees solely for the purpose of collective bargaining.80 To this 
point, the Court argued that Abood does not apply to cases involving 
employees employed by more than one employer.81 The Court also 
noted that extending Abood’s holding to cover the instant case 
would be inefficient; because the state has so little control over the 
PAs, their potential for achieving results through collective 
bargaining with the state is greatly diminished.82 
Because Abood was distinguishable, the Court determined that 
an independent examination of the law’s consistency with the First 
Amendment was appropriate.83 The Court applied the strict 
scrutiny standard and held that the fair share provision in the 
instant case “does not serve a ‘compelling state interes[t] . . . that 
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of 
associational freedoms,’” and thus, that the provision does not 
comport with the First Amendment.84 
2. The Pickering Balancing Test 
Pickering v. Board of Education established that for matters of 
public concern, speech of public employees is protected under the 
First Amendment where the interests of the public employee “in 
commenting upon matters of public concern” outweigh the 
interest of the state “in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.”85 If the Pickering test 
 
 79.  Id. at 2634. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 2634–35. 
 82.  Id. at 2636.  
 83.  Id. at 2639. 
 84.  Id. (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289 
(2012)). The Harris Court merely demonstrated that “the speech compelled in this 
case is not commercial speech.” Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2639. Despite its 
proclamation that “no fine parsing of levels of First Amendment scrutiny is 
needed” to decipher the proper standard to apply, it is unclear how the Court 
arrived at strict scrutiny. Id.  
 85.  391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), abrogated in part by Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 
410 (2006). Pickering arose when a public school teacher was fired after he 
published a letter chastising the local school board for their alleged misallocation 
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applied here, and if the interest of the state in promoting efficient 
labor outweighed the interest of the PAs in refraining from 
association with the union, the PAs’ speech would not be protected 
under the First Amendment. However, the Harris Court reasoned 
that Pickering did not excuse the state’s use of fair share fees in the 
instant situation because: (1) Pickering only applied to cases where 
the state takes a “traditional employer role”; and (2) the interest of 
the employees here outweighed the interest of the state in 
promoting efficiency.86 
C. Dissenting Opinion 
The four member dissent, authored by Justice Kagan, stood 
with the Seventh Circuit and mirrored its reasoning in several ways. 
Primarily, the dissent argued that: (1) the majority had no reason 
to distinguish Abood and that Abood should control; and (2) even in 
the absence of Abood, the petitioners’ claim does not pass the 
Pickering balancing test. 
1. Abood as Controlling Precedent 
Justice Kagan argued primarily that the Seventh Circuit was 
sound in its conclusion that Abood controls in the instant case.87 
First, the dissent argued, the state, as an employer, held enough 
control over the PAs that the collective bargaining and fair share 
fees allowed in Abood could logically be extended to the present 
case.88 Second, the dissent rebutted the majority’s conclusion that 
Abood cannot be applied in instances where employees have more 
 
of funds. Id. at 564. The teacher filed suit, claiming that the First Amendment 
protected his publication of the letter. Id. at 565. The Court established the 
aforementioned balancing test when it upheld the teacher’s claim, finding that 
the teacher’s interest in writing a letter on a matter of public concern outweighed 
the school’s interest in promoting efficiency. Id. at 574–75. 
 86.  Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2642–43. The majority was adamant that Pickering 
does not apply in Harris. However, when it states that even if Pickering applied, the 
employees’ speech would be protected, the Court fails to address Garcetti. Garcetti 
states that First Amendment free speech does not protect employee speech “made 
pursuant to [the employee’s] official responsibilities.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 411. 
Thus, it is possible that an employee’s refusal to support his or her collective 
bargaining union’s activities is “speech” related to the employee’s official 
responsibilities, in which case such speech would be unprotected under Garcetti. 
 87.  Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2644–45 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
 88.  Id. at 2645. 
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than one employer, contending that there is no precedent 
indicating “that joint public employees are not real ones.”89 While 
the dissent conceded that the question of whether the state is an 
actor’s employer is not answered merely by examining the label the 
state chooses to use for that actor,90 the dissent claimed that the 
state had “sufficient stake in, and control over, the petitioners’ 
terms and conditions of employment to implicate Abood’s rationales 
and trigger its application.”91 
2. Pickering as Controlling Precedent 
The dissent next posited that applying Abood to the instant case 
created results that comport with the law set out in Pickering. Justice 
Kagan began her analysis by pointing out that Abood gets at largely 
the same issue as Pickering, and that “its core analysis mirrors 
Pickering’s.”92 Both Abood and Pickering address “the extent of the 
government’s power to adopt employment conditions affecting 
expression.”93 
The dissent then asserted that the line drawn in Abood between 
acceptable and unacceptable infringements on free speech and 
free association came from Pickering. Justice Kagan noted that “[o]n 
the one side, Abood decided, speech within the employment 
relationship about pay and working conditions pertain[ed] mostly 
to private concerns and implicate[d] the government’s interests as 
employer; thus, the government could compel fair-share fees for 
collective bargaining.”94 This followed Pickering’s rationale that 
speech of little public concern can be restricted.95 The dissent 
contrasted this with state employee speech in political campaigns, 
which “relates to matters of public concern and has no bearing on 
the government’s interest in structuring its workforce,” observing 
that “compelled fees for those activities are forbidden.”96 
 
 89.  Id. at 2648. 
 90.  Id. at 2649; see also Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 679 
(1996) (stating that employment status with the state is not “dependent on 
whether state law labels a government service provider's contract as a contract of 
employment”). 
 91.  Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2649 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 92.  Id. at 2654. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 96.  Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2654 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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3. Necessity of Abood in Current Law 
The dissent, like the majority, expressed its sentiments on 
Abood in extensive dicta.97 Justice Kagan came out staunchly in favor 
of Abood, chiding Justice Alito’s “gratuitous dicta critiquing Abood’s 
foundations” and commenting that the majority’s unwillingness to 
overturn Abood is the “one aspect of [the] opinion [that] is cause 
for satisfaction.”98 The dissent commented that Abood “is deeply 
entrenched, and is the foundation for not tens or hundreds, but 
thousands of contracts between unions and governments across the 
Nation,” and that it is a “foundation stone of the rule of law.”99 
While its comments on Abood did not directly inform its holding, 
the dissent may have used its approval of the case to justify applying 
it in Harris.100 
IV. A DEEPER LOOK INTO HARRIS V. QUINN: HOW HARRIS 
HIGHLIGHTS THE FLAWS OF ABOOD 
This Note will now argue that Abood should have been 
controlling in Harris, and that the Court distinguished Abood as a 
pretense to achieve their desired legal outcome. Next, it will show 
that without Abood, the Harris majority’s ruling would have been 
proper under Pickering. Finally, it will argue that instead of merely 
critiquing Abood in dicta, the Harris Court should have overturned 
Abood as unconstitutional. 
A. Abood is Controlling 
As Justice Kagan flatly stated at the beginning of her dissent, 
“Abood . . . answers the question presented in this case.”101 The 
majority attempts to distinguish Harris from Abood in a variety of 
ways, but ultimately, Abood addressed the same issue as Harris: 
 
 97.  For the Court’s criticism of Abood, see id. at 2632–34. For the dissent’s 
opinion on Abood, see id. at 2645–46. 
 98.  Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2645. 
 99.  Id. at 2645, 2651 (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 
2024, 2036 (2014)). 
 100.  In a similar manner, the majority used its disapproval of Abood to justify 
distinguishing it: “Because of Abood’s questionable foundations, and because the 
personal assistants are quite different from full-fledged public employees, we 
refuse to extend Abood to the new situation now before us.” Id. at 2638 (majority 
opinion).  
 101.  Id. at 2644–45 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
18
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss4/7
7. Ling_FF4 (1237-1266) (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2016  11:26 AM 
2016] TRANSGRESSIONS OF A TIMID JUDICIARY 1255 
whether an agency shop fee could be enforced for non-union 
public employees.102 Nonetheless, it is worth addressing some of the 
majority’s major reasons for distinguishing Abood. 
First, the majority contends that Abood is distinguishable 
because the PAs in Harris are only nominally “state-employees.”103 
The majority reasoned that since “the customer has virtually 
complete control over” the PAs, the bargaining power of the PAs 
with respect to the state would be diminished.104 The Court stated 
that “[i]f we allowed Abood to be extended to those who are not 
full-fledged public employees, it would be hard to see just where to 
draw the line.”105 But this conclusion fails both textually and 
substantively. 
In terms of the text of the case, Abood was never constrained to 
“full-fledged” public employees in the first place.106 It merely held 
that “a recognized [public] union may seek to have an agency-shop 
clause included in a collective-bargaining agreement.”107 
The conclusion that the PAs are not full-fledged public 
employees is also substantively inaccurate. While it is true that the 
Illinois statute defines the PAs as state employees “[s]olely for the 
purposes of coverage under the [PLRA],”108 employment status with 
the state is not defined by “state law labels.”109 The Illinois statute 
and the majority opinion in Harris dramatically understated the 
role of the state in the PAs’ employment;110 Illinois controls the PAs 
in several meaningful ways. The state “sets all the workforce-wide 
terms of employment.”111 It pays wages, benefits, and health 
insurance; establishes qualifications; sets baseline requirements for 
 
 102.  See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 225 (1977). 
 103.  See Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2634–35 (“Illinois withholds from personal 
assistants most of the rights and benefits enjoyed by full-fledged state 
employees.”). 
 104.  Id. at 2637. 
 105.  Id. at 2638. 
 106.  In fact, as pointed out earlier, the major point of contention in Abood was 
that the employees required to pay the agency shop fees were public employees, 
and were thus employed by an intrinsically political organization. Abood, 431 U.S. 
at 227; see supra Section II.B. 
 107.  Abood, 431 U.S. at 224. 
 108.  20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2405/3 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. 
Sess.). 
 109.  Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 679 (1996). 
 110.  See Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2634 (“[P]ersonal assistants are almost entirely 
answerable to the customers and not to the State.”). 
 111.  Id. at 2646 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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service; and structures the relationship between the customer and 
the PA.112 When the customer and the PA draft a service plan, along 
with the customer and the PA, a state-employed counselor attends 
the drafting process.113 The amalgamation of these factors provides 
for more than enough state control to make unionization and 
collective bargaining worth the employees’ time.114 
The majority also argued that there is a difference between 
unwillingly funding private speech and unwillingly funding public 
speech, which is more often political in nature.115 While this may be 
a strong policy argument, Abood expressly addressed and dismissed 
this point when it stated that “[t]he differences between public- 
and private-sector collective bargaining simply do not translate into 
differences in First Amendment rights.”116 Without explicitly 
overturning Abood, this policy argument holds no precedential 
weight.117 
In sum: (1) the PAs in Harris are clearly state employees both 
substantively and under the text of Illinois law; and (2) the policy 
arguments the majority made to the contrary lack even a scintilla of 
precedential support. The reality of the situation, uncommented 
upon by the Harris majority, but painfully clear, was that Justice 
Alito and the Court’s four other most conservative justices did not 
want to rule in favor of collective bargaining, and distinguished 
Abood as a legal veneer for their result-oriented conclusion.118 
 
 112.  Id. at 2646–47. 
 113.  Id. at 2647. 
 114.  It seems that a disjointed workforce, such as the one in the instant case, 
where PAs are working in private homes and do not communicate regularly, would 
benefit more from collective bargaining, not less, as the majority claims. See id. at 
2635 (majority opinion); 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 312, Westlaw (database updated 
Dec. 2015) (“The ultimate purpose of a collective-bargaining agreement is a 
common understanding on the terms and conditions of labor.” (emphasis added)). 
 115.  Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2632.  
 116.  Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977). 
 117.  Stare decisis dictates that the Court’s prior rulings—and not its policy 
arguments provided in dicta—on a given question of law form legal precedent. 
E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Applicability of Stare Decisis Doctrine to Decisions of 
Administrative Agencies, 79 A.L.R.2d 1126 (1961); see also Dickerson v. United States, 
530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“While stare decisis is not an inexorable command, 
particularly when . . . interpreting the Constitution, even in constitutional cases, 
the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure 
from precedent to be supported by some special justification.”) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted). 
 118.  The advancement of unionization and collective bargaining is generally 
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B. The Majority’s Ruling Is Sound in the Absence of Abood 
Without Abood as controlling precedent, the majority’s ruling is 
correct. Absent a case like Abood that specifically rules on the 
constitutionality of the infringement of public employees’ First 
Amendment rights, determinations of the First Amendment rights 
of public employees are made using the Pickering balancing test.119 
For matters of public concern, an employee’s “interest as a citizen 
in making public comment must be balanced against the State’s 
interest in promoting the efficiency of its employees’ public 
services.”120 
The Pickering analysis begins with a determination of whether 
the speech in question pertains to a matter of public concern.121 A 
public employee “must accept certain limitations on his or her 
freedom,”122 and, as the Court has stated, “When a public employee 
speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead 
as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the 
 
seen as a liberal agenda in American politics. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Labor Law as 
Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 BERKELEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 450, 455 (1981) (“[T]he development of collective bargaining law is 
paradigmatic of all public policy in liberal capitalism.”); The Battle to Bring 
Entitlements Under Control, 28 NO. 11 EMP. ALERT 3 (2011) (“A prominent 
manifestation of the . . . switch from liberal Democrats to conservative Republicans 
. . . is the move . . . to end collective bargaining by public employees.”). More 
specifically, Justice Alito, author of the Harris majority, has stated that the 
“aggressive use of power by the SEIU to collect fees from nonmembers is 
indefensible.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2288, 2291 (2012). 
 119.  Note that Pickering does not specifically address free association, but in 
the instant case it is enough to merely address the issue of free speech, as the 
association in question—association with a labor union—is only contested as it 
relates to compelled speech. Free speech and free association rights “are 
interrelated, because First Amendment rights of freedom of association derive 
from constitutional rights of freedom of speech,” and thus, “there is no First 
Amendment right to associate in order to engage in forms of speech that are not 
protected by the First Amendment.” Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: 
Compelled Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, 
Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 566 (2006). 
 120.  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). There always exists 
the possibility that Pickering could be found not to protect speech under Garcetti. 
See supra note 86 and accompanying text. But as neither the Court nor the union 
mentioned Garcetti in the above context, it is not useful for this Note to consider 
the matter thoroughly. 
 121.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). 
 122.  Id. 
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most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate 
forum.”123 Public concern is determined by considering the 
“content, form, and context of a given statement.”124 
The speech of unions in the collective bargaining process is a 
matter of public concern.125 The mere fact that a government 
employee is speaking on an issue that may implicate public 
spending does not mean the speech itself is a matter of public 
concern.126 The public spending, in this case, is spending on 
Medicaid. In a 2014 study, only 1% of Americans had “no opinion” 
on whether they were satisfied with Medicaid.127 As of 2009, 
expenditures for Medicaid constituted 2.7% of the United States’ 
gross domestic product, and Medicaid enrollment consisted of 
“about one of every five persons in the [United States].”128 Clearly, 
Medicaid spending is an issue that affects numerous Americans in 
significant ways and is a matter of great public concern.129 Thus, 
 
 123.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). 
 124.  Id. at 147–48.  
 125.  The dissent in Harris takes the opposite stance: that collective bargaining 
is not a matter of public concern. Harris III, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2642 (2014). 
However, the majority notes: “This argument flies in the face of reality . . . [as] the 
category of union speech that is germane to collective bargaining unquestionably 
includes speech in favor of increased wages and benefits for personal assistants.” 
Id. 
 126.  Id. at 2655 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court has never come close to 
holding that any matter of public employment affecting public spending . . . 
becomes for that reason alone an issue of public concern.”). 
 127.  Frank Newport, Most Americans Remain Satisfied with Healthcare System, 
GALLUP (June 16, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/171680/americans               
-remain-satisfied-healthcare-system.aspx?g_source=Medicaid&g_medium=search 
&g_campaign=tiles. 
 128.  CHRISTOPHER J. TRUFFER ET AL., 2010 ACTUARIAL REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL 
OUTLOOK FOR MEDICAID i–iii (2010), https://www.cms.gov                        
/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/ActuarialStudies/downloads 
/MedicaidReport2010.pdf. 
 129.  The concept that congressional spending is a matter of public concern is 
so fundamentally ingrained in U.S. democracy that it is difficult to provide 
authority for the statement other than polling data. Chief Justice Roberts 
attempted a trim definition of “public concern” in Snyder v. Phelps, writing that 
“speech is of public concern when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any 
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,’ or when it ‘is a 
subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.’” Snyder v. 
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 444 (2011) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 
(1983); San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)). Chief Justice Roberts noted 
in his definition that “[a] statement’s arguably ‘inappropriate or controversial 
character . . . is irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public 
22
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having established public concern, it is appropriate to proceed with 
the Pickering balancing test. 
The next step is determining how the public employees’ 
interest, as citizens, in making public comment balances against the 
state’s interest in promoting the efficiency of its employees’ public 
services.130 While the state normally has a strong interest in 
enforcing the agency fee provisions—as exclusive union 
representation promotes labor stability—the instant case is slightly 
different.131 Labor stability is not a major concern because, as the 
Harris Court mentioned, “the [PAs] do not work together in a 
common state facility but instead spend all their time in private 
homes, either the customers’ or their own.”132 The PAs’ interest in 
speaking on a matter of public concern is great when measured 
against the government’s meager interest in promoting labor 
stability amongst PAs who never see each other. If the PAs were 
private employees, the only compelled speech of public concern 
would be the support of collective bargaining. However, since the 
PAs are compensated through federal Medicaid funding, by forcing 
PAs to contribute to collective bargaining for increased wages, for 
instance, the state compels the PAs to support the expansion of 
Medicaid.133 
 
concern.’” Id. (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 378 (1987)). 
 130.  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
 131.  See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220–21 (1977) (citing 
Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 67–70 (1975); S. 
REP. NO. 573, at 13 (1935)) (asserting that use of a single representative “avoids 
the confusion that would result from attempting to enforce two or more 
agreements specifying different terms and conditions of employment,” which 
“prevents inter-union rivalries from creating dissension within the work force and 
eliminating the advantages to the employee of collectivization” and “frees the 
employer from the possibility of facing conflicting demands from different unions, 
and permits the employer and a single union to reach agreements and settlements 
that are not subject to attack from rival labor organizations”) (citation omitted). 
 132.  Harris III, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2640 (2014) (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry 
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 51 (1983)). 
 133.  See id. at 2642 (“Increased wages and benefits for personal assistants 
would almost certainly mean increased expenditures under the Medicaid 
program.”). 
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C. The Harris Court Should Have Overturned Abood 
Despite the majority’s extensive critique of Abood, the Court 
failed to overturn Abood in Harris.134 This was a mistake, as: (1) 
Abood unconstitutionally infringes on public employees’ right to 
First Amendment free speech; and (2) the enforcement of Abood 
creates myriad administrative difficulties. 
1. Abood Is Unconstitutional 
The key difference between Abood and Pickering, and the 
reason that Pickering is justified under the First Amendment while 
Abood is not, is Pickering’s use of a balancing test.135 While Abood did 
not utilize a balancing test, opting for a universal declaration that 
“the government’s own interests ‘constitutionally justified’ the 
interference” with state employees’ free speech,136 Pickering 
required that the government’s interest in efficient labor actually 
outweigh the employees’ interest in free speech.137 Thus, when 
situations like that in Harris arise where a balancing test determines 
that constraints on free speech violate the First Amendment, Abood, 
as precedent, unconstitutionally waives the balancing test. 
Beyond Harris, there are numerous other situations where 
Abood unconstitutionally infringes on free speech. Part of the 
reason why Abood runs into so many constitutional problems is that 
it deals with public employees. Public employees are employed by 
the government and any collective bargaining deals intrinsically 
with political speech. Both Abood and the dissent contend that 
“[n]othing in the First Amendment or our cases discussing its 
meaning makes the question whether the adjective ‘political’ can 
properly be attached to those beliefs the critical constitutional 
 
 134.  The Court certainly considered overturning Abood. According to the 
dissent, “The petitioners devoted the lion’s share of their briefing and argument 
to urging us to overturn that nearly [forty]-year-old precedent. . . . Today’s 
majority cannot resist taking potshots at Abood . . . but it ignores the petitioners’ 
invitation to depart from principles of stare decisis.” Id. at 2645 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
 135.  See supra Section III.B.2. 
 136.  Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2646 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Abood, 431 
U.S. at 222). 
 137.  See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (balancing public 
employees’ interest, as citizens, in making public comment against the State’s 
interest in promoting the efficiency of its employees’ public services); see also supra 
Section III.B.2. 
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inquiry.”138 This assertion is, frankly, astonishing. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has held numerous times that this is not true. In the seminal 
case Boos v. Barry, the Court invalidated legislation proscribing 
political speech, holding that the United States has a “‘profound 
national commitment’ to the principle that ‘debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’”139 
2. Abood Creates Administrative Concerns 
In addition to its constitutional issues, Abood establishes 
precedent that is rife with administrative difficulties. These 
difficulties come primarily from the unclear standard that Abood 
sets out. 
The majority covered many of the public policy issues in its 
opinion; primarily, the policy goal, as stated earlier,140 is to ensure 
that agency fees do not create “compulsory subsidization of 
ideological activity.”141 But this is, administratively, a difficult 
standard to enforce. 
Abood allows agency fees to go toward “union expenditures that 
are made for collective-bargaining purposes,” but not toward 
expenditures “made to achieve political ends.”142 In cases of private 
employees, it would be easy to distinguish these two goals because 
funding for collective bargaining would go to the employer, while 
political funds would go to the state. But in cases of public 
employees, the state is the employer, and making the distinction is 
much more difficult.143 
 
 138.  Abood, 431 U.S. at 232; Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2644–45 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (“Abood . . . answers the question presented in this case.”). 
 139.  Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)); see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 
(2003) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976), superseded by statute, 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81; 
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)) (suggesting that among the 
forms of speech to which “the constitutional guarantee [of free speech] has its 
fullest and most urgent application” are “the discussion of political policy 
generally [and] advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation”), overruled by 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16 (summarizing 
a party’s argument that constraints on political speech “constitute restraints on 
First Amendment liberty that are both gross and direct”). 
 140.  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 141.  Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 237 (1977). 
 142.  Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2632. 
 143.  See id. at 2632–33 (“In the private sector, the line is easier to see. 
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As the majority points out, many courts have struggled with 
this issue.144 The Court in Ellis took an expansive view of the Abood 
standard by stating that agency fees could go toward “the expenses 
of activities or undertakings normally or reasonably employed to 
implement or effectuate the duties of the union as exclusive 
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.”145 But in 
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, just seven years later, the Court 
narrowed the holding again, stating that fees could not go to 
“lobbying activities [that] relate not to the ratification or 
implementation of a dissenter’s collective-bargaining agreement, 
but to financial support of the employee’s profession or of public 
employees generally.”146 Not only do these cases demonstrate 
disparate interpretations of Abood, they also fail to clarify its 
holding. What expenses can be “reasonably employed to 
implement or effectuate the duties” of a union? The Court’s 
inability to clarify the Abood standard speaks further to the 
imprecision of this standard in the first place. 
Thus, as demonstrated, the Court had two reasons to overturn 
Abood. First, Abood unconstitutionally infringes on First Amendment 
rights. Second, Abood is immensely difficult to administratively 
enforce. 
D. Abood Can Be Overturned Because It Is Not “Super Precedent” and 
Its Absence Will Not Harm Present Law 
In response to the majority opinion’s criticism of Abood, the 
dissent argued that the majority’s reluctant decision to let Abood 
stand was correct, and that Abood cannot be overturned because of 
extensive union reliance on its holding.147 While it is true that many 
states and unions have relied on Abood in collective bargaining 
agreements,148 this argument is not persuasive. 
 
Collective bargaining concerns the union’s dealings with the employer; political 
advocacy and lobbying are directed at the government. But in the public sector, 
both collective-bargaining and political advocacy and lobbying are directed at the 
government.”).  
 144.  See supra Section III.B. 
 145.  Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984). 
 146.  Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 520 (1991); see supra Section 
II.C. 
 147.  See supra Section III.C.3. 
 148.  Harris III, 134 S. Ct. at 2645 (“The Abood rule is deeply entrenched, and is 
the foundation for not tens or hundreds, but thousands of contracts between 
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This idea of incontrovertible precedent is aptly termed “super 
precedent” in the academic community.149 Super precedent consists 
of “those constitutional decisions in which public institutions have 
heavily invested, repeatedly relied, and consistently supported over 
a significant period of time.”150 They are decisions that “are deeply 
embedded into our law and lives through the subsequent activities 
of the other branches.”151 
The dissent’s argument is unpersuasive, partially because the 
debate over whether super precedent is a valid legal concept is far 
from over; many legal scholars disapprove of a heightened level of 
precedential value.152 The debate over the value of super precedent 
is a complex topic, and the intricacies of the argument cannot be 
contained within the scope of this Note. Thus, this Note will 
address the primary flaw in the dissent’s reasoning: Abood is not 
entrenched deeply enough into the legal system to be construed as 
super precedent. 
“A case that can credibly be characterized as a super precedent 
is distinctive in part because it is so deeply engrained in 
constitutional law that it cannot be reconsidered—much less 
overturned—without considerable excavation.”153 An obvious 
example is Marbury v. Madison, perhaps the first case to which every 
new constitutional law student is exposed.154 Abood is plainly not 
such a case that can be characterized as “super precedent.” The 
dissent stated that Abood is the source of authority for “thousands of 
contracts between unions and governments across the Nation.”155 
 
unions and governments across the Nation.”). 
 149.  See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204 
(2006). 
 150.  Id. at 1205. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  For some common arguments, see Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a 
Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A Response to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232 
(2006). 
 153.  Gerhardt, supra note 149, at 1222. 
 154.  5 U.S. 137 (1803). Marbury established judicial review, hinted at the 
political question doctrine, and is bound to the very fabric of American 
jurisprudence as we know it. Id. at 154. Like Abood, Marbury has not been without 
its fair share of controversy. See Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original 
Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 
329, 329 (“Marbury v Madison has come to draw argument as a cornflower draws 
bees.” (internal quotation omitted)). Unlike Abood, however, Marbury is part and 
parcel of American common law. 
 155.  Harris III, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2645 (2014). 
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The dissent did not provide support for this figure, but even if it is 
accurate, the statistic does not provide the rootedness that is 
necessary to establish super precedent.156 The vast majority of 
contracts the dissent cited would be valid even without Abood under 
Pickering.157 
The jurisprudential discord Abood left behind is also evidence 
that Abood does not have the unifying precedential effect necessary 
to proclaim it super precedent.158 In Abood’s wake lies a string of 
divergent decisions, both over when union spending of agency fees 
is allowed and over methods of contesting the spending of such 
fees.159 The standard for qualification as super precedent is lofty, 
requiring a fairly unified stream of case law relying on the original 
case.160 Surely a case producing such discrepant results as Abood 
does not qualify.161 Overturning Abood would undoubtedly cause 
some turbulence, likely inducing non-union employees to sue their 
unions on the premise that their agency fee contracts were 
unconstitutional.162 But mere fear of political or legal turbulence 
does not justify super precedent treatment: super precedent, as 
shown, is reserved for those pinnacles of institutional reliance that 
Abood does not yet reach.163 
 
 156.  Gerhardt, in his discussion of super precedent, regales readers with an 
explanation of why even a monumentally significant case like Miranda v. Arizona 
does not rise to the level of super precedent. Gerhardt, supra note 149, at 1218. 
(“The difficulty with characterizing Miranda as a super precedent is that the 
Supreme Court has recognized a number of exceptions weakening (some say, 
eviscerating) Miranda. While the decision endures symbolically in the public 
consciousness, it does not endure with the same robustness it first had.”). 
 157.  Harris is an unusual case in that the group of workers attempting to 
unionize is made up almost exclusively of PAs that work from home, causing a 
situation where the government has a diminished interest in labor peace, swinging 
the Pickering balancing test more in favor of individuals. See generally Harris III, 134 
S. Ct. 2618. Because of this, supporting agency shop fees in Harris via the Pickering 
analysis is more difficult than it would be in cases concerning unified workforces 
where the government has a stronger interest in labor peace. See supra Section 
III.B.2. 
 158.  See supra Section II.C. 
 159.  See supra Section II.C. 
 160.  Gerhardt, supra note 149, at 1205–06. 
 161.  See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 162.  See supra Section III.B. 
 163.  Gerhardt, supra note 149, at 1205. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In sum, this Note draws three primary conclusions. First, the 
majority erred in distinguishing Abood from Harris. Abood plainly 
covers within its scope the situation in Harris, and Harris is not 
distinguishable. Second, this Note concludes that in the absence of 
Abood, under the Pickering balancing test, the majority’s argument is 
solid, and the Illinois law is unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment. Finally, this Note concludes that the majority erred in 
failing to overturn Abood. Abood, in its failure to use a balancing test, 
unconstitutionally infringes upon public employees’ First 
Amendment rights. 
The negative outcomes of this decision are twofold. First, the 
manner in which the Harris decision was made is in and of itself a 
negative outcome. The outcome of Harris was determined by the 
political leanings of Justices, backed not by the letter of the law, but 
by a loose, policy-based analysis of cases.164 Abood clarified that the 
role of determining the merits of collective bargaining belonged to 
Congress, and not to the judiciary. While the Abood Court 
recognized that “‘[m]uch might be said pro and con’ about the 
union shop as a policy matter,” it reaffirmed in its opinion that “it is 
Congress that is charged with identifying ‘[t]he ingredients of 
industrial peace and stabilized labor management relations.’”165 
Abood should have been controlling, but a result-oriented court 
distinguished it in a sui generis manner.166 
The second, more significant consequence is that by criticizing 
Abood in dicta but not overturning it, the Court is giving further 
unwarranted credence to Abood as super precedent and making it 
 
 164.  See Harris III, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014). The fact that political interests 
were involved is made apparent in the 5-4 split. The five-member majority 
comprised the conservative core of the Court: Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia, 
Thomas, and Kennedy. Justice Kagan’s dissent was joined by her left-leaning 
judicial compatriots, Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Breyer.  
 165.  Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 218 (1977) (quoting Ry. 
Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 233–34 (1956)). 
 166.  The majority’s motivation for distinguishing Abood is clear, given the 
torrential deluge of criticism Justice Alito leveled at Abood in both Harris and Knox. 
See supra Section III.C.3; see also Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 
2290–91 (2012) (complaining that “Abood . . . assumed without any focused 
analysis that the dicta from Street had authorized the opt-out requirement as a 
constitutional matter”).  
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yet more difficult to overturn.167 Abood was an unconstitutional 
judicial decision, and the Court—as a result of timidity and 
unwillingness to overturn what they perceived to be a deeply rooted 
judicial decision—allowed the bad precedent set by Abood to stand. 
If super precedent is a false concept, then Abood should be 
overturned on its merits; as demonstrated, Abood is an 
unconstitutional decision that serves no present purpose other 
than to spawn ever more incomprehensible legal standards.168 And 
if super precedent indeed exists, if stare decisis is truly “an 
inexorable command in constitutional adjudication,” the Court 
should heed its own words. It is high time to reverse Abood, lest it be 
borne inexorably into the annals of common law.169 
 
 167.  See supra Section IV.D. 
 168.  See supra Section II.C. 
 169.  Gerhardt, supra note 149, at 1204. 
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